Vicios epistémicos del saber-cómo

Arthur, W. y Day, E. A. (2019). Skill decay: The science and practice of mitigating skill loss and enhancing retention. En P. Ward (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of expertise. Oxford Uni-versity Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198795872.013.47

Astola, M. (2021). Mandevillian virtues. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 24(1), 19–32. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-020-10141-9

Baehr, J. (2021). The structure of intellectual vices. En I. J. Kidd, H. Battaly y Q. Cassam (Eds.), Vice epistemology. Routledge.

Ballantyne, N. (2019). Knowing our limits. Oxford University Press.

Barker, B. (2021). Epistemic injustice and performing know-how. Social Epistemology, 35(6), 608–620. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2021.1882608

Battaly, H. (2014). Varieties of epistemic vice. En J. Matheson y R. Vitz (Eds.), The ethics of be-lief. Oxford University Press.

Battaly, H. (2015). Epistemic virtue and vice: Reliabilism, responsibilism, and personalism. En C. Mi, M. Slote y E. Sosa (Eds.), Moral and intellectual virtues in Western and Chinese philosophy (pp. 99–120). Routledge.

Birch, J. (2018). Joint know-how. Philosophical Studies, 176(12), 3329–3352. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1176-6

Bird, A. (2010). Social knowing. Philosophical Perspectives, 24, 23–56.

Bird, A. (2022). Knowing science. Oxford University Press.

Bland, S. (2022). In defence of epistemic vices. Synthese, 200(1), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03572-7

Cassam, Q. (2016). Vice epistemology. The Monist, 99(2), 159–180. https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onv034

Cassam, Q. (2019). Vices of the mind: From the intellectual to the political. Oxford University Press.

Code, L. (1984). Toward a ‘responsibilist’ epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Re-search, 45(1), 29–50. https://doi.org/10.2307/2107325

Conolly, D., Horn, S. y Loewenstein, G. (2024). (Inaccurate) beliefs about skill decay. SSRN. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4916412

de Bruin, B. y de Rooij, B. (2022). Real life collective epistemic virtue and vice. En M. Alfano, J. De Ridder y C. Klein (Eds.), Social virtue epistemology (pp. 396–423). Routledge.

Dolin, J. (2025). Against obstructionism. Episteme. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2024.38

Dougherty, M. (2020). Gilbert Ryle and the ethical impetus for know-how. Journal for the His-tory of Analytic Philosophy, 8(1). https://doi.org/10.15173/jhap.v8i1.3973

Fantl, J. (2008). Knowing-how and knowing-that. Philosophy Compass, 3(3), 451–470.

Fricker, M. (2008). Epistemic injustice. Oxford University Press.

Fricker, M. (2010). Can there be institutional virtues? En T. S. Gendler y J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford studies in epistemology (Vol. 3, pp. 235–253). Oxford University Press.

Fricker, M. (2020). Institutional epistemic vices: The case of inferential inertia. En I. J. Kidd, H. Battaly, y Q. Cassam (Eds.), Vice epistemology (pp. 89–107). Routledge.

Friedman, J. (2017). Junk beliefs and interest-driven epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomeno-logical Research, 97(3), 568–583. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12381

Greco, J. (1999). Agent reliabilism. Noûs, 33(s13), 273-296. https://doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.13

Gilbert, M. (2013). Joint commitment: How we make the social world. Oxford University Press.

Habgood-Coote, J. (2022). Collective practical knowledge is a fragmented interrogative capaci-ty. Philosophical Issues, 32(1), 180–199. https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12219

Harman, G. (1986). Change in view: Principles of reasoning. MIT Press.

Hawley, K. (2011). Knowing how and epistemic injustice. En J. Bengson y M. A. Moffett (Eds.), Knowing how: Essays on knowledge, mind, and action (pp. 283–299). Oxford University Press.

Holroyd, J. (2020). Implicit bias and epistemic vice. En I. J. Kidd, Q. Cassam, y H. Battaly (Eds.), Vice epistemology. Routledge.

Hookway, C. (2006). Epistemology and inquiry: The primacy of practice. En S. C. Hetherington (Ed.), Epistemology futures (pp. 95–110). Oxford University Press.

Hughes, N. (2019). Dilemmic epistemology. Synthese, 196, 4059–4090.

Kidd, I. J. (2017). Capital epistemic vices. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 6(8), 11–16.

Kidd, I. J. (2021a). A case for a historical vice epistemology. HUMANA.MENTE: Journal of Philosophical Studies, 14(39), 69–86.

Kidd, I. J. (2021b). Epistemic corruption and political institutions. En M. Hannon y J. de Ridder (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of political epistemology (pp. 347–358). Routledge.

Kidd, I. J. (2022). From vice epistemology to critical character epistemology. En M. Alfano, J. De Ridder, y C. Klein (Eds.), Social virtue epistemology (pp. 84–102). Routledge.

Kidd, I. J. (Ed.). (2024.). Epistemic vices: From the individual to the collective. Synthese. https://link.springer.com/collections/hceibhbhje

Kidd, I. J., Cassam, Q., y Battaly, H. (Eds.). (2020). Vice epistemology. Routledge.

Kotsonis, A. (2022). A novel understanding of the nature of epistemic vice. Synthese, 200, 57. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03519-y

Levy, N., y Alfano, M. (2020). Knowledge from vice: Deeply social epistemology. Mind, 129(515), 887–915. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzz017

Madison, B. (2017). On the nature of intellectual vice. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 6(12), 1–6.

McKenna, R. (2023). Non-ideal epistemology. Oxford University Press.

Medina, J. (2021). Vices of the privileged and virtues of the oppressed in epistemic group dy-namics. En M. Hannon y J. de Ridder (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of political epis-temology (pp. 336–346). Routledge.

Miyazono, K., y Iizuka, R. (2023). A group identification account of collective epistemic vices. Synthese, 202, 22. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04235-x

Montmarquet, J. (1987). Epistemic virtue. Mind, 96(384), 482–497. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/xcvi.384.482

Montmarquet, J. (1993). Epistemic virtue and doxastic responsibility. Rowman y Littlefield.

Morton, A. (2013). Bounded thinking. Oxford University Press.

Müller, J. (2015). Aristotle on vice. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 23(3), 459–477.

Nguyen, C. T. (2020). Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Episteme, 17(2), 141–161.

O’Connor, C. (2023). Modelling scientific communities. Cambridge University Press.

Palermos, S. O., y Tollefsen, D. P. (2018). Group know-how. En J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S. O. Palermos, y D. Pritchard (Eds.), Socially extended epistemology (pp. 112–131). Oxford University Press.

Pritchard, D. (2007). Anti-luck epistemology. Synthese, 158, 277–297. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9039-7

Pritchard, D. (2012). Anti-luck virtue epistemology. Journal of Philosophy, 109(3), 247-279. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil201210939

Roberts, R. C. y Wood, W. J. (2007). Intellectual virtues. Clarendon Press.

Ryle, G. (1947). Knowing how and knowing that. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 46, 1–16.

Schwitzgebel, E. (2019). Aiming for moral mediocrity. Res Philosophica, 96(3), 347–368. https://doi.org/10.11612/resphil.1806

Smart, P. R. (2017). Mandevillian intelligence. Synthese, 195(9), 4169–4200. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1414-z

Sosa, E. (1999). How to defeat opposition to Moore. Philosophical Perspectives, 13, 141–154.

Sosa, E. (2015). Judgment & agency. Oxford University Press.

Srinivasan, A. (2015). Normativity without Cartesian privilege. Philosophical Issues, 25(1), 273–299. https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12059

Tanesini, A. (2021). The mismeasure of the self. Oxford University Press.

Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Cambridge University Press.

Zagzebski, L. (1996). Virtues of the mind. Cambridge University Press.